B
oth of us are history-of-science buffs, with special emphasis on mathematics and operations research (OR). It seemed to us that, since OR as a scientific discipline recently passed its 50th anniversary in the US, the time was right to capture in some form our view of the history of OR. The question: What should be the form?
Most histories are narrative and chronological in their presentation. In his widely read Men of Mathematics (1937) , Eric T. Bell travels across the centuries by discussing the achievements of 33-plus mathematicians who were active in the corresponding epochs. In A Concise History of Mathematics (1967) , Dirk Struik starts with the ancients and moves rapidly through the centuries in an attempt to capture all the major people and events in 195 pages (hence, making it really concise). More to our interest is Michael Kirby's Operational Research in War and Peace: The British Experience from the 1930s to 1970 (2003 , in which he relates how OR got started in the UK and beyond by describing in some detail background events, critical activities, and the prime movers. From our perspective, however, the short history of OR seemed to be a jumble of people (Blackett, Bellman, Dantzig, Erlang, Morse) and events (the Battle of Britain, mathematical and statistical advances, the digital computer) that somehow coalesced into a new science. Trying to describe how it all came about in the usual narrative format seemed not the way to go. What to do?
We remembered from the 1960s a two-by-12 foot poster of "men of modern mathematics" that IBM distributed. It started in 1100 AD and went through to the mid-1950s, describing with pictures and text mathematicians and their achievements. The poster presented a time-line history of mathematics. We thought that the time-line format would be appropriate for relating the history of OR.
From a time perspective, a description of OR is rather tightly constrained, extending from the mid1930s to the present day; we certainly would not need a 12 foot poster! Of course, OR has precursors, especially such mathematical developments as Gauss's 1795 method of least squares. But because time-line posters tend to use a just-the-facts approach, we did not think we could use an explicit poster layout to express and interpret our view of OR. Instead, we decided to adapt the time-line approach to book form. The result, An Annotated Timeline of Operations Research: An Informal History, was published by Springer Science (Gass and Assad 2005) . If you joined the book's 192 text pages, you would have a poster 10 inches high by 114 feet long! During our research, we made serendipitous and interesting discoveries, especially when we were trying to track down original sources based on secondary or tertiary references. We plan to discuss such finds in a short series of related Interfaces "Model World" columns. We start with the definition of OR and the origins of Monte Carlo simulation. The Definition of OR: The Case of the Missing Superscript OR evolved from its military roots, which were established prior to and during World War II. During that period, many OR-based analysts recognized that the methods they were developing to resolve operational man-machine problems had potential beyond the confines of the military. What was it all about, and how could it be defined, described, and disseminated?
The name of this new scientific approach, operational research, is attributed to Albert P. Rowe, circa 1938. At that time, Rowe, a meteorologist, was the superintendent of the Bawdsey Research Station in Suffolk, England. The British military had established Bawdsey in 1936 to study how it could best integrate fighter aircraft and the recently developed radar to protect the homeland (Kirby 2003) . Subsequently, during World War II, the early British and the later US military groups expanded the OR effort to cover operations by all the services. At the end of the war, OR analysts held meetings and wrote reports to describe, and in a sense, to formalize the methodological ideas and techniques of this new scientific approach to resolving decision problems. Many hoped that they could modify and expand the military OR successes into the nonmilitary sphere.
Philip M. Morse and George E. Kimball (1946) Morse and Kimball (1946) do not give the above definition, but start with the following:
In World War II, the phrase "operations research" has come to describe the scientific, quantitative study of operations of war. Perhaps a more descriptive term would be "polemology," from the Greek word "polemos" meaning warfare, but the more familiar "operations research" will be retained in the present treatise because it suggests that the methods can be used to study other operations than those of war (p. 1).
They give no explicit definition of OR in the 1946 volume. On page 1, almost two columns into the discussion, a superscript a appears that refers to the page's footnote, which ends with the superscript 1 pointing to the first document in the 1946 book's bibliography, which concerns US submarine doctrine. None of the four references of the 1951 edition under the superscript 1 are cited in the 1946 edition; they all were published after 1946.
In our research for our time line, we delved into the writings of early UK OR practitioners. With reference to the definition of OR, we kept encountering the name Charles Kittel. In one of the first articles on OR to appear in a general scientific journal (Nature), Charles Goodeve (1948) gave a definition of OR that "is based on that put forward by Kittel." Patrick M. S. Blackett (1950) , in the first paper to appear in the Operational Research Quarterly, cited "Dr. Kittell's [sic] well-known definition of operational research " More recently, Kirby (2003) cited the use of Kittel's definition by Goodeve and others. We found only three US OR references to Kittel: a paper by Kittel (1947) , and two annotated bibliographies of OR (Riley 1953 , Batchelor 1959 In April 1942, a group of seven scientists was assigned to the antisubmarine warfare unit of the Atlantic fleet. This group grew to about 40 members and, in July 1943, was incorporated into the staff of the 10th fleet as the antisubmarine warfare operations research group (ASWORG). Philip Morse was director of ASWORG, with Kittel a member of the staff.
From 1945 to 1946, Kittel was a Guggenheim Foundation fellow in physics at MIT. There he wrote an article for Science "The nature and development of operations research," probably the first paper on OR to appear in a US scientific journal (Kittel 1947) . He started this article as follows:
Operations research is a scientific method for providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions (p. 150).
In a concise description of the origins and methods of OR, Goodeve (1948) Without explanation, Goodeve changed for to of and added the important last phrase "regarding the operations under their control." This is the definition Morse and Kimball (1951) used. The important last phrase is the watchword of OR practitioners; a major reason many OR implementations fail is the lack of executive control.
After World War II, Kittel returned to physics, first at Bell Telephone Laboratories (1947 to 1951 and then as a Berkeley faculty member. He never wrote anything else about OR. He was surprised to learn in 2003 that his definition had been transformed somewhat, been used by Morse and Kimball (1951) , and was still cited. Kittel's (1947) article is well worth reading. He wrote that the "big secret" weapons developed in World War II took years to be deployed, while
The big, though little publicized, successes of operations research, such as the Bay of Biscay anti-U-boat offensive, the destruction of German blockade runners in the South Atlantic, the initiation of large convoys in the Atlantic, were in action within one or two months after the original idea was put forward (p. 151).
Kittel went on to describe the OR aspects of thousandplane raids, large merchant-vessel convoys, bombing raids of Japan, and submarine wolf packs. He ended his paper as follows:
It is hoped that the publication of this paper will serve to stimulate the establishment of operations research groups in the United States for the advancement of peaceful objectives. This powerful new tool should find a place in government and industry (p. 153). If Kittel's paper did nothing else, it gave us an initial definition of OR. We must, however, credit Goodeve for its modification and Morse and Kimball for its promulgation. The definition has held up well for over 50 years.
Origins of Monte Carlo Simulation
Like OR, Monte Carlo simulation had its roots in World War II and evolved rapidly in the succeeding years. Its story has been told before, but presenting its story as a time line is challenging. If we consider statistical sampling for estimating a quantity of interest to be the central feature of the Monte Carlo method, its antecedents go back to Buffon's needle problem (1733). If we consider generating random variates as a key component of the Monte Carlo method, we must cite Francis Galton's (1890) dice for producing normally distributed random numbers. In his book, the historian of statistics Stephen Stigler (1999) devoted a chapter to stochastic simulation in the 19th century. He discussed different devices statisticians of this period used for generating random numbers with a known distribution. Moving into the 20th century, Leonard H. C. Tippett (1925) systematically generated random numbers to confirm his results on extreme value distributions. Tippett (1927) published a list of random digits, thus providing a published source for a stream of random numbers, a key ingredient for a Monte Carlo simulation. Behind the success of the Monte Carlo method was the conjunction of such statistical ideas with the advent of the computer. Like the solution of a linear-programming (LP) problem, a Monte Carlo simulation requires repeated calculations on a massive scale, a hopeless task in earlier times. In fact, the potential utility of both LP and the Monte Carlo method provided an impetus for the development of electronic computers.
The initial development of Monte Carlo simulation was intertwined with the birth of scientific computing. The main force responsible for this development was a close community of mathematicians and physicists employed at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory: Stanislaw Ulam, John von Neumann, Nicholas Metropolis, Enrico Fermi, Richard Feynman, Robert Richtmyer, and Edward Teller. To this list of scientific notables, we add the newly born Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC). This computing machine was developed by the University of Pennsylvania's Moore School of Electrical Engineering for the Aberdeen Proving Ground, where it was supposed to be deployed for the computation of ballistic tables.
Today, the image evoked by the wartime Los Alamos community is a collection of scientists feverishly engaged in building the atom bomb. But a salient feature of the work around 1944 was computing. Indeed, Los Alamos might rightfully be regarded as the birthplace of heavy-duty scientific computing. As Metropolis and Nelson (1982, p. 348 ) noted, computing at Los Alamos "evolved from hand computing (1943), supported by mechanical calculators, through punched-card computation, to electronic computing on the ENIAC (1945)." Initially, Marchant calculators, hand-operated by a team of women, carried the burden of scientific computing. Use of these calculators was so intense that Feynman and Metropolis took the time to learn about their inner workings so they could repair them on site. They also organized an assembly line approach to computing: each operator would perform simple numerical calculations and pass her results to the next operator in the line (Feynman 1980) . In 1944, von Neumann joined the Los Alamos group, where his expertise in hydrodynamics made him especially valuable. He focused on the use of numerical techniques to study the hydrodynamics of the implosion necessary to trigger a nuclear detonation. In early 1945, as the ENIAC was going through its final stages of construction, von Neumann invited Metropolis and Stanley Frankel to use the ENIAC for computations related to the thermonuclear weapon (the superbomb). He argued that this would constitute a more rigorous test of ENIAC's capabilities than the calculation of bombing tables. The computations involved complicated difference equations that approximated the underlying differential equations associated with the simulated fusion process. The solution would specify the energy release and describe the hydrodynamics of the thermonuclear weapon (Gallison 1997, pp. 698-699 the question was what are the chances that a Canfield solitaire laid out with 52 cards will come out successfully? After spending a lot of time trying to estimate them by pure combinatorial calculations, I wondered whether a more practical method might not be to lay it out say one hundred times and simply observe and count the number of successful plays. This was already possible to envisage with the beginning of the new era of fast computers, and I immediately thought of problems of neutron diffusion Later [in 1946, I] described the idea to John von Neumann and we began to plan actual calculations (p. 131).
It is not surprising that Ulam would think of a process like the Monte Carlo method for solving such computational problems. As a pure mathematician, he had been a prominent member of the circle of Polish mathematicians, the Lvov School of Mathematics, which included Stefan Banach, Kazimierz Kuratowski, and Stanislaw Mazur. In the early 1930s, Ulam had already made major contributions to measure theory, ergodic theory, and the foundations of probability. At Los Alamos, he had modeled the fission process for neutrons as a probabilistic process and encouraged David Hawkins to work on the problem of finding the distribution of the progeny in such a process. The result was Hawkins and Ulam's (1944) Los Alamos report on "multiplicative processes" in which they described their independent rediscovery of what is now known as branching processes and their significant extensions to the theory.
The first modeling application of Monte Carlo simulation concerned the neutron diffusion process in fissionable material. A key problem was to estimate the neutron multiplication rate: for a collection of neutrons within a given geometry at time zero, what fraction will survive after a short time interval t? The final collection of neutrons would consist of the surviving original neutrons and the new neutrons produced as a result of fission. The simulation approach to this problem was to trace out the history of a neutron as it underwent various interactions in its path. The simulated events followed the free flight of a neutron (or free-path length) between collisions and the type of collision it underwent. The Monte Carlo analysis determined the actual outcomes of these chance events by sampling from known distributions. For example, a random number following known probabilities determined whether a collisioninducing fission produced two, three, or four neutrons. Some of the random variates required did not follow a uniform distribution. For example, the free path, defined to be the distance the neutron will travel until it encounters its next collision, is known to be an exponential random variable. Thus, von Neumann's computing scheme required generating nonuniform variables.
In his March 11, 1947 letter to Robert Richtmyer, theoretical division leader at Los Alamos, von Neumann wrote about the "possibility of using statistical methods to solve neutron diffusion and multiplication problems, in accordance with the principle suggested by Stan Ulam." Von Neumann, who, since August 1945, had become quite familiar with the capabilities of the ENIAC, prepared a "computing sheet" that specified the sequence of required calculations. He felt that such computations were within the logical capacity of the ENIAC and estimated that the computational time required to trace 100 primary neutrons through 100 collisions would take about five hours.
This letter, together with von Neumann's computing notes and Richtmyer's letter of response, formed the first written report on the Monte Carlo method. It was issued as a classified Los Alamos report entitled "Statistical methods in neutron diffusion" (April 9, 1947) . The report listed R. D. Richtmyer and J. von Neumann as the writers and specified that it represented "work done" by Ulam and von Neumann. The report contained 22 pages, was issued in only eight copies, and remained classified until 1959. It referred to the Monte Carlo method as "the Statistical Method."
Another of von Neumann's letters, this one to Ulam on May 21, 1947 (von Neumann and Richtmyer 1947) , is of equal historical interest because it focuses on two approaches for generating nonuniform random variates, both of which are now standard textbook approaches. Suppose that the random variate is required to follow a distribution with density function f x . The first method is the well-known inverse transform method. It uses the inverse of the cumulative distribution function F x to convert uniformly distributed random numbers to those following the distribution F x . Von Neumann's letter makes it clear that this procedure was known to Ulam. The second approach, which is von Neumann's, is now called the acceptance-rejection method. It uses pairs of independent uniform random numbers Y and U and accepts the value of Y when it satisfies U ≤ f Y . The accepted values follow the distribution F x . Von Neumann noted in his letter that the method assumes that the density function f x lies between 0 and 1.
The ENIAC was installed at the ballistics research laboratory at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland in July 1947. According to Metropolis (1989) , von Neumann convinced the authorities at Aberdeen to allow Los Alamos to run simulations of a one-dimensional model of a thermonuclear explosion being studied by Teller's group. The resulting computations became known as the "shakeout cruise" of the ENIAC.
The Monte Carlo method was formally announced by Ulam and von Neumann in an abstract submitted to the American Mathematical Society on September 3, 1947. They stated that this procedure was " analogous to the playing of a series of 'solitaire' card games and is performed on a computing machine. It requires 'random' numbers with a given distribution" von Neumann 1947, p. 1120) .
Metropolis coined the term Monte Carlo around 1947 and first used it in a paper in 1949 (Metropolis and Ulam 1949) . Apart from the obvious reference to the role of chance, Metropolis knew of an uncle of Ulam's "who would borrow money from relatives because 'he just had to go to Monte Carlo.' " In this paper, Metropolis and Ulam also illustrated the application of Monte Carlo methods to combinatorial problems (as opposed to physics problems) by finding the probability of successful outcome in a game of solitaire where skill plays no role.
Von Neumann's interest in the method was contagious, and he succeeded in getting others interested. While other Los Alamos groups made Monte Carlo runs on the ENIAC, the method also found enthusiasts outside the classified realm. The growth of the Monte Carlo method from 1947 to 1950 was rapid and cannot be fully described here. George Forsythe at the National Bureau of Standards' Institute for Numerical Analysis at the University of California, Los Angeles, created a Monte Carlo project in the fall of 1948. Richtmyer was carrying out Monte Carlo runs at IBM in New York. The RAND Corporation, the National Bureau of Standards, and the Oak Ridge Laboratory jointly sponsored the first open symposium on the Monte Carlo method in Los Angeles in June 1949. By this time, the Monte Carlo method had an established reputation and a number of applications to its credit.
We have traced the development of the Monte Carlo method as contemporaneous with the advent of computers. However, we recall an interesting wartime application of Monte Carlo thinking that did not rely on computers: the work of Princeton statistician Samuel Wilks for the National Defense Research Council. The problem was to find the number of bombs required to "blast a safe corridor through an enemy mine field" (Goldstine 1993) . Under the assumption that all bomb craters were ellipses of the same size and orientation, Wilks obtained the coordinates of each crater by sampling a pair of random numbers (drawn from two hats) and kept track of the number of craters (bombs) required to create a connected path through the field. This experiment, which has a strong OR flavor, was a computer-free Monte Carlo simulation! Monte Carlo without a high-speed computer reduces to statistical sampling and a source of random numbers. This idea seems to have been in the air. Hawkins (1989) recalls Ulam talking about this approach in 1944. The Nobel laureate atomic physicist Enrico Fermi was an even earlier originator. Fermi was well known for his impressive ability to provide good estimates of physical quantities of interest based on fundamental principles and carefully chosen assumptions or approximations. In 1947, he started to take an interest in the computational aspects of the neutron diffusion problem and the Monte Carlo method. Fermi's student and collaborator, the Nobel laureate Emilio Segrè (1980) , noted, I know that Fermi had invented, but of course had not named, the present Monte Carlo method when he was studying the moderation of neutrons in Rome. He did not publish anything on the subject, but he used the method to solve many problems with whatever calculating facilities he had, chiefly a small mechanical adding machine (p. 221).
Segrè also told Metropolis (1989) how Fermi took pleasure in surprising his Roman colleagues with "remarkably accurate" predictions of experimental results which he derived from calculations based on statistical sampling techniques he had developed. These statements place Fermi's interest in the subject prior to 1938, the year he left Rome to receive his Nobel prize and then to emigrate to the US. Unfortunately, they do not provide enough detail to tell us what Fermi's approach was and the extent to which it could be generalized. Fermi, Ulam, and John Pasta later collaborated to analyze the behavior of nonlinear systems. Their work is an early instance of what is now called chaos theory.
